The paper investigates the drivers of the outsourcing decisions of firms located in a specific local production system. Different kinds of drivers are considered drawing on different strands of the literature, considering the firm from an organizational point of view, and as a production, industrial and innovation unit of analysis. Theoretical correlations between outsourcing decisions and variables are formulated and tested with respect to a representative cross-section sample of the firms in Reggio Emilia, a local production system in Emilia Romagna. The main result of the paper is that, in the local context investigated, transaction costs do not seem to be a significant driver of outsourcing. The decision to externalize is rather driven by other arguments, strongly based on the resource -competence approach, factors such as the need for tapping into the providers to promote technological innovation. On the other hand, these drivers are contrasted by the industrial relations of the firms, as workers and workers' representatives significantly hamper it, possibly fearing job losses, or at most expect to be involved in the relative decision in order to make it possible or even spur it. These results have important implications, both at the research level-at which they suggest to complement the transaction cost analysis of outsourcing with that of other approaches-and at the management level-at which they support the thesis that external organizational innovations, such as outsourcing, cannot neglect internal organizational aspects, such as human resource management and industrial relations.
Introduction
Empirical evidence shows that both the volume and the value of intermediate inputs and business production services contracted out by firms, that is, of outsourcing, have risen dramatically in the last two decades (Domberger, 1998; Spencer, 2005) . The determinants and the implications of the "buy-rather-than-make" decision have thus become a core topic in industrial organization. The attention of standard approaches has focused, in particular, on transaction costs (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002) , ownership allocation and efficient investments (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986) , formal vs. real authority (e.g. Aghion and Tirole, 1997) and more generally on the incentive conflicts entailed (Foss, 2000) .
Outsourcing has also attracted the attention of "non-standard" approaches, which focus on production, rather than transactions by addressing the role of firms' capabilities and competences (e.g. Mahnke, 2001) . Along the same lines, real-time contractual analysis of the vertical scope of the firm (e.g. Langlois, 1992; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999) has highlighted path-dependency and inertia. 1 Production and savings in production costs have also been identified as key drivers of outsourcing in the literature on international outsourcing (i.e. off-shoring) (e.g. Kohler, 2004; Grossman and Helpman, 2005) . And finally, the industrial organization literature has recognized the strategic role of outsourcing in driving competition among firms within specific sectors (e.g. Shya and Stenbacka, 2003) .
Although all these different kinds of outsourcing drivers are important, there are few comprehensive analyses of them. This is unfortunate, given recent arguments that vertical integration and disintegration could benefit from the resolution of the "production -transaction dichotomy" their independent investigation implies (Langlois and Foss, 1999; Montresor, 2004) and research that combines both aspects (e.g. Williamson, 1999; Nooteboom, 2004; Jacobides and Winter, 2005) .
We share this view, claiming in this paper that further combined analyses are required to capture the "real" nature of the outsourcing firm. This is especially true for those firms that, while competing in specific industrial sectors, are also involved in the division of labour in production processes that occur in delimited portions of the territory, that is, in local production systems (LPS). The spatial closeness of firms in these systems makes analysis of production and standard organizational issues inseparable. Furthermore, as these firms are embedded in business and socio-institutional networks, their industrial structure and innovation profile must be included in outsourcing decisions. Thus, in the context of a LPS, we recommend a combined analysis that extends the atomistic approach of organizational theory and industrial organization to include system-wide issues, and refines the networkcentric approach of regional and local development analyses (e.g. Schutjens and Stam, 2003; Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005) focusing on microeconomic aspects.
This methodological approach constitutes one of the main elements of originality of this paper, and sets it apart from standard studies on discipline-specific outsourcing drivers. The second value added of this paper consists of the empirical application of this methodology to a large sample of firms within a specific province of Emilia RomagnaReggio Emilia-where the district atmosphere and industrial relations determine an idiosyncratic LPS. Although to establish the actual role of a particular LPS in making one kind of outsourcing driver more important than another would require comparative study, dealing with a representative sample of firms enables us to ascertain how far being part of a LPS makes outsourcing dependent on this kind of embeddedness. We expect that in this (and possibly other similar) cases (e.g. Gonzalez-Diaz et al., 2000) , the arguments that emerge from studying the firm as an (atomistic) organizational unit of analysis will be less powerful than those emerging from analyses at other levels.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the outsourcing drivers identified through a comprehensive literature review (Section 2.1) and contextualizes their analysis within a LPS-type environment (Section 2.2). Section 3 presents the empirical study of the LPS of Reggio Emilia and describes the data-set (Section 3.1), the econometric model (Section 3.2), the variables (Section 3.3) and the main results of the econometric estimations (Section 3.4). Section 4 concludes.
What Drives (or Hampers) Outsourcing?

A Comprehensive Literature Review
Drawing on various strands of literature in addition to the economics of the firm, we can identify several drivers of outsourcing. Based on the specific approach to the firm, we can categorize them as organizational, production, industrial and innovation outsourcing drivers. For each group, we have schematically identified and signed expected correlations (Tables 1-4) , with a plus to indicate they are drivers, with a minus if they are obstacles, and with both signs if the effect is ambiguous. It should be noted that, although we cannot claim this categorization to be exhaustive, these four groups of outsourcing drivers or obstacles correspond to the main areas of research in micro-analyses of vertical integration and disintegration strategies. Also, several sources have argued that the joint analysis is necessary to understand a phenomenon related to the firm's contractual transactions and resources and competences (Williamson, 1999) , within its setting in a particular specific industrial sector and technological regime (Mahnke, 2001) .
Organizational outsourcing drivers. Organization theory looks for outsourcing drivers in the specific features of the "constituencies" with which the firm is identified.
Some follow straightforwardly from the dominant theoretical approach, that is, transaction cost economics (TCE). This is the case, for asset specificity which, according to standard TCE (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002) and property-rights (e.g. Antras and Helpman, 2004) theories, spurs rent-seeking behaviours by opportunistic agents, and would be better managed within rather than outside the firm's boundaries (Williamson, 1975) (Table 1: i) . Similarly, market uncertainty raises the costs of re-contracting and thus impedes outsourcing only if the relevant transaction requires investments in specific assets, being otherwise unpredictable (Table 1: ii, iii). TCE also claims that tangible assets are less costly than intangible assets (e.g. intensive of human capital) to externalize, as information is more verifiable in the former case (Table 1: iv) . Nevertheless, according to TCE and to alternative theoretical accounts in organization theory (e.g. Kelley and Harrison, 1990) , the degree of the firm's product differentiation and of geographical diversification spurs outsourcing in order to avoid the internal costs of monitoring they imply: that is, excessive diversity of internally managed assets increases the firm's administrative costs (Coase, [1937 (Coase, [ ] 1988 (Table 1: v, vi) .
Other TCE-based correlations are more blurred. For example, the degree of hierarchy in the firm's organization, while representing a spanner for multiple decision-control mechanisms which TCE claims might make outsourcing more conflictual, also provides the 
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organizational innovations synthetic index of new organizational practices see þ /2 More correlations emerge from adopting alternative theoretical perspectives to look at the firm. By drawing on less standard TCE accounts that incorporate history, "governance inseparability" (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999) emerges as important as asset specificity. Given that new contractual arrangements, such as a prospective outsourcing, are interlinked with, and affected by, the existing contractual nexus of the firm that has emerged along its history, those factors that increase the "contractual thickness" of the firm-such as the presence and role of unions in the firm's outsourcing decisions, and the firm's age (Table 1 : viii, ix)-might be expected to hamper outsourcing (e.g. Mahnke, 2001 ). In addition, governance inseparability might affect the role of specific assets in outsourcing decisions. Indeed, the firm might find it impracticable to externalize non-specific assets if this conflicts with existing governance arrangements, or might decide to outsource some specific assets if this enables their actual implementation. The effect of the interaction between asset specificity and governance inseparability on outsourcing is thus ambiguous (Table 1: x).
Although less easily captured, there are other drivers of outsourcing that emerge from a resource -competence approach to the firm (e.g. Montresor, 2004) , in particular, the knowledge related to the interfaces among the assets being outsourced and those remaining within the firm's boundaries (Nellore and Soderquist, 2000) . 2 The more explicit (e.g. represented by norms and rules) is this "interface knowledge" the easier it is to separate the firms' activities and capabilities. Thus, the degree of codification is an important factor in outsourcing. For example, the organizational placement of outsourced activities within the firm, typically in another division, is an outsourcing enabler (Table 1 : xi).
Production outsourcing drivers. In labour microeconomics and industrial relations studies, outsourcing is related to production costs, and particularly labour costs (Table 2) .
3 Indeed, savings on labour costs, that is, wages, that are relatively higher than those of competitors, are usually the main determinant of what is called "operative outsourcing", in which large clients exploit small providers in a dualistic kind of labour market (Table 2: i). However, if a "developmental" or a network/cluster approach is adopted, in which outsourcing involves "similar" firms based on a "strategic" rationale rather than a search for lower wages (Deavers, 1997) , labour costs may have no impact and thus would be expected to be non-significant (Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005) . The driving role of the skill intensity of the firm's activities is also ambiguous in the sign of its relationship (Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005) (Table 2 : ii). While firms with higher skilled labour might be expected to specialize in "non-production" activities (e.g. research and development (R&D), engineering and the like) and to outsource standard production functions, they might also be expected to prefer not to outsource in order to maintain the organizational competences built up from the workers' 2 The qualitative and/or quantitative description of an input -output kind of relationship between two establishments is the most common example of such knowledge. In its absence, outsourcing would be hampered by the "opportunity" costs of specifications (e.g. delays and production interruptions in the transition) and codification, both direct (i.e. in terms of effort) and indirect (i.e. in terms of loss of richness and detail) (Mahnke, 2001) . 3 In this literature outsourcing is seen as resorting to "market mediated work arrangements". For a survey see Bartel et al. (2005) , although the set of arguments addressed here is a sub-set of that literature. skills. In this case, the effects of labour costs for outsourcing when interacted with skills content should be negative (Table 2: iii).
If we adopt a production-based approach to outsourcing, some of the drivers identified under the organizational umbrella change. For example, firm's union density acts to increase the cost of labour, providing the firm with an incentive to outsource (Abraham and Taylor, 1996) (Table 2 : iv). Similarly, at firm level, uncertainty costs, that is, the costs incurred in coping with uneven demand for its products and services (e.g. Houseman, 2001) , are as important as labour costs, and also act to stimulate outsourcing ( Industry outsourcing drivers. In industrial organization, outsourcing plays yet another role and is conceived of as a "strategic" means of intra-industry competition (Shya and Stenbacka, 2003: 205) , which, in turn, is dependent on the features of the market (Table 3) . 5 First, the degree of concentration of the market can be used as an outsourcing variable. Its effects are twofold (Table 3 : i). The less concentrated the market, the more outsourcing will work as an instrument to increase competition; on the other hand, in more concentrated markets firms are shielded from competition by the possession of unique resources or capabilities. Accordingly, the costs of "governance differentiation" (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999: 29-30 ) that outsourcing entails are more bearable in more concentrated markets. Second, there is the role of firm size, which is also ambiguous (Table 3 : ii). According to a Smithian argument, increasing returns from specialization emerge, provided that the outsourcing firm's demand (and output) is sufficiently large. On the other hand, one of the aims of the outsourcing firm will be to benefit from the supplier's experience in the provision of the relevant production input or service, through its larger scale operation (e.g. Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005) . Also, the size of the firm has an effect, for example, in terms of industrial relations (Hyman, 2003) . On the one hand, good industrial relations might entail a larger participation of the workforce representatives in the outsourcing decision, and thus increase its feasibility. 6 On the other hand, good industrial relations might again mean higher governance inseparability and thus less outsourcing (Table 3: iii).
Innovation outsourcing drivers. Both neo-Schumpeterian and evolutionary economics recognize the important role of outsourcing in innovation. First, in dealing with the uncertainty induced by a "technological shock": the higher this uncertainty, the higher will be the costs of accommodating it through some kind of "governance switch" in more vertically integrated firms (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999) (Table 4 : i). More generally, in a technological 4 First, the firm could find that smoothing the work flow by outsourcing would be less costly than rescheduling for peak demand periods internally, through flexible work arrangements (Abraham and Taylor, 1996: 398) . Second, in deciding the proper "capacity reservation strategy", installing a fixed capacity and obtaining additional capacity by outsourcing might be less costly in terms of capacity setting costs, than installing a fixed capacity and postponing unsatisfied demand to future periods (de Kok, 2000) . 5 The table does not report the outsourcing arguments in the literature on "strategic outsourcing" based on gametheory (e.g. Kamien et al., 1989; Spiegel, 1993; Baake et al., 1999) or those based on a network/cluster approach (Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005) . Although important, they are omitted as testing them would have required very detailed data on inter-firm relationships which are not available in our data-set. 6 Furthermore, outsourcing might itself improve the quality of industrial relations by transferring some of the responsibility outside the firm (Benson and Ieronimo, 1996) . regime (TR) characterized by "creative destruction" (a Schumpeter Mark I TR), outsourcing can be expected to enable the firm to upgrade its knowledge and capabilities by tapping into the "provider", even at the risk of some knowledge leakage. This leakage, in its turn, will discourage outsourcing in a TR characterized by "knowledge accumulation" (a Schumpeter Mark II TR) (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993; Mahnke, 2001) (Table 4 : ii). Outsourcing also affects the firm's degree of innovativeness, although not unambiguously. Indeed, the "conventional" wisdom that associates innovation with the advantages of vertical integration has been seriously questioned by the "relational view" (Mol, 2005: 575) , which considers establishing connections with outside suppliers to be crucial in terms of networking and learning-by-interacting (e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1998; Brusoni et al., 2001) (Table 4: iii).
7 There is a similar ambiguity surrounding the incidence of outsourcing on the innovation radicalness of the firm (Table 4 : iv). If radical innovations are seen as "systemic innovation" (Teece, 1986) and/or new "disruptive" products (Christensen et al., 2002) , requiring interdependent development efforts, vertically integrated firms should be superior. But if the radicalness is due to the rearrangement of existing variables in an unfamiliar framework (Henderson and Clark, 1990 ), a decentralization process that creates appreciable diversity in information signals and stimulates networking effects might be more appropriate (Robertson and Langlois, 1995) . Finally, as outsourcing could be thought of as a special kind of organizational change, it might be expected to substitute for other kinds of organizational innovations directed at re-enforcing the efficacy and efficiency of the firm's production processes (Table 4: v) . Or, alternatively, as being complemented by other changes in the firm's organization (job rotation practices, quality circles, etc.). In the context of this twofold relationship, flexibility is identified as one of the most relevant organizational innovations (Table 4 : vi). 
Outsourcing in LPS?
Although the four groups of outsourcing drivers described above are quite general and, in principle, are equally important, they might have different explanatory power in different contexts. Belonging to a high-tech rather than to a low-tech sector, for example, might make the firm's innovation drivers more relevant. Similarly, location in a country with relatively high labour costs might increase the explanatory power of the production drivers. Also, depending on the context, correlations identified as ambiguous might emerge clearly as either drivers or obstacles.
Of course, the number of contexts in which the outsourcing firm can be framed are numerous. In this paper, however, we focus on the context of firms in a LPS, for example, an industrial district (e.g. Brusco, 1982; Becattini, 2001) . Within this socio-economic context 7 In particular, by helping the firm to overcome the "learning-traps" they face in balancing knowledge exploration and exploitation (Leonard-Barton, 1992) . On the reverse side, however, outsourcing might make the firm excessively dependent on external suppliers (Benson and Ieronimo, 1996; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) and compromise its absorption of new, external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) and thus its "dynamic capabilities" (Teece et al., 1997) . 8 Indeed, a relationship between flexibility and outsourcing has been proposed with respect to all its different meanings (Benson and Ieronimo, 1996) . As argued by Benson and Ieronimo (1996: 60) , "outsourcing contributes to all three forms of flexibility (functional, wage and numerical). Tasks undertaken are contract-not craft-related, payment is made only for work completed, and worker numbers can be adjusted to the production requirements of the plant." outsourcing takes on special features that are quite different from those of large, relatively more isolated companies. In many Italian industrial districts, for example, and particularly those specialized in the textile, apparel and ceramics sectors (e.g. Bramanti, 1992) , outsourcing has been found to follow a cooperative rather than a competitive mode, relying on tacit performance agreements, trust and reciprocal adjustments (Suarez-Villa, 1988: 7) . More generally, the territorial proximity between purchaser and provider of an outsourced activity may potentially generate a number of outsourcing economies in the particular LPS. For instance, in allowing firms to save and divert resources to core activities, such cooperative types of outsourcing would prevent the emergence of disparities among firmsfor example, in terms of access to physical and human capital, knowledge and competences-which might result in the transaction impoverishing the innovative capabilities of the smaller or weaker partner (Suarez-Villa and Rama, 1996) .
On the basis of these and other arguments and evidence, our expectation is that, in a LPS context, among the organizational drivers identified in Table 1 , those that entail an atomistic kind of approach to the firm, such as standard TCE drivers, will not be significant, or, at least, their role will be less significant than that of the organizational drivers that incorporate firms' embeddedness, such as those referring to governance inseparability.
As far as production drivers are concerned ( Table 2 ), given that a LPS typically represents a specific kind of local labour market, wage-related differences will likely have less explanatory power than other, skills-related drivers.
In terms of industrial outsourcing drivers (Table 3) , our expectations are informed by the fact that LPS generally are dominated by the presence of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which resort to outsourcing as a means of implementing a heterarchic labour division within the system, rather than exploiting the competences of large-scale suppliers. Accordingly, large firms would not be expected to have any systematic advantage from outsourcing, while the reality might be different.
Finally, as anticipated in the above, the specific features of LPS are expected to make the relationship between outsourcing and innovation (Table 4) closer than in other contexts. This is because the cooperative environment in which the firms are embedded attenuates conflicts over access to physical and human capital, knowledge and competences, which are necessary for innovation.
It is difficult to formulate many other expectations without specifying the activity being considered for outsourcing. Indeed, as the empirical literature shows, both the determinants and effects of outsourcing are very much conditional on the activity (Love and Roper, 2001) and this is also context-specific outsourcing information. A LPS context usually reveals a distribution of outsourcing across activities that favours the decentralization of material, routine-based activities with low value added compared to intangible activities with higher value added, which are better kept internal Antonioli, 2009) . It should be remembered that the production processes that occur in a LPS environment are typically intensive of tacit knowledge, which is usually embodied in intermediate products and in the production stages that encompass similar processes. In general, in LPS tacit knowledge is more important than explicit knowledge, which represents the outcome of activities generally seen to be of higher value added, for example, R&D, engineering, human resource management and the like (Russo, 1986) . This is confirmed by the fact that, unlike in non-LPS kind of contexts, the externalization of production activities impacts on firms' labour productivity more than that of services, both low and high value (e.g. Montresor et al., 2008) . Accordingly, in the empirical analyses, the outsourcing of production activities is assigned a higher weight than service outsourcing.
Outsourcing in Reggio Emilia: Empirical Analysis
The different specifications of different outsourcing drivers in a LPS context are investigated for the case of Reggio Emilia (RE), 9 a province in the Italian region of Emilia Romagna.
Although a comparative approach involving other regions would provide a better illustration of the importance of firm embeddedness in a LPS for outsourcing, RE can be considered representative of a local model of development, whose specificities with respect to the alternatives, mainly big-company-led models, have been investigated widely, thus enabling comparison with the results in this paper. Historically, the areas with the strongest industrial structures in Emilia Romagna since the 1950s, have been RE, the provinces of Modena and Bologna in the eastern part of the region, and Parma in the western part, the so-called "Emilia centrale" running along the "Via Emilia" route connecting Milan with the Adriatic coast (Rimini) (Bianchi, 1997) . This industrial area of the region, RE, has been traditionally the most advanced and richest in Emilia Romagna in terms of high rates of employment, strong presence of SMEs, very high per-capita income levels compared with the Italian average and good levels of social welfare (Aronica, 1998; Bianchi and Gualtieri, 1999) . The LPS of RE is also characterized by the presence of public organizations that provide funding for services, infrastructure, social security and so on, and contribute to creating a particularly efficient institutional set-up (Putnam et al., 1994; Becattini and Rullani, 1997; Bianchi and Gualtieri, 1999; Seravalli, 2001; Ginzburg, 2005) . The presence of strong, well-rooted and proactive unions which shape the RE industrial system is fundamental. In a strategic framework that encompasses conflicts and industrial relations problems, firm-level relations between management and union representatives are driven by participative and cooperative behaviour in the pursuit of mutually agreed aims and mutual benefits .
These characteristics of the industrial context of RE render it a paradigmatic version of the so-called "Emilian model", marked by the presence of a district-like industrial system, a well-defined spirit of entrepreneurship and a strong and deep-rooted unionism (Brusco, 1982; Brusco and Solinas, 1997; Amin, 1999) . On the other hand, however, RE is distinguished by the importance of its industrial relations system, the strength of its innovative activity and the relationships between these aspects (Emilia Romagna, 2004) . For example, the typical "dense" industrial relations in the area and the participation of workers' representatives in managerial decisions related to the work organization, are indicative of the potentially important role of industrial relations and TCE in outsourcing decisions. A recent survey, carried out in 2002 on a population of 9 Also when replicating the "general regression" using the new weights, we find that the overall evidence is confirmed.
Some covariates show a reduction (but not a loss) of significance: UNION and GROUP reduce to 10 per cent, only ORGINNO and FIRMAGE are not significant (as above). All other covariates show the same level of significance. F-test and R 2 are only marginally lower (0.0002 and 0.171 compared to those in Table 7 ). We would again emphasize that the use of a very rich array of outsourcing typologies (17) reduces the sensitivity of the overall outsourcing index to different weighting schemes.
257 firms with at least 50 employees, provides some interesting insights in this last respect (Pini, 2004) . First, although the sample of respondents is characterized by a high density of mediumsized firms, they usually comprise two or three plants, with up to two of them located in RE, and average employment of less than 145 employees (Pini, 2004 , Appendix 1, Tables 11A  and 11B of CD data). Second, a considerable number of the surveyed firms are located in "industrial districts" (Brusco, 1982) , characterized by a few but strong production specializations, namely: nonelectrical machinery and equipment-machinery for mechanical energy and agriculture in particular-and non-metallic mineral products-ceramic tiles in particular. Larger scale specialization is represented by other sectors such as clothing and communication equipment (Table 5) .
Finally, an analysis of a representative sample of the firm population (described in the following) reveals that RE is characterized by extensive outsourcing. Nearly 87 per cent of the sample decentralized some of their activities in the period 1998-2001 (Antonioli and Tortia, 2004: 68) , 52.3 per cent to subcontractors. On the other hand, there are differences in the decisions to outsource in terms of the number and nature of the activities that are externalized. In this last respect, the survey identifies a total of 17 activities, which we group into three classes based on functional criteria: (i) "ancillary activities", that is, accessory to the actual production process, meant as the transformation of production inputs into outputs (e.g. janitorial services); (ii) "production supporting activities", not primarily productive, but contributing more directly to the production process than the former (e.g. engineering); (iii) "production activities" (Table 6 ). Based on this classification, we can see that cleaning services, for example, are decentralized in 85.55 per cent of cases, but the percentage is only around 8 per cent for non-purely ancillary activities, such as human resource management (8.67 per cent) and quality control (8.09 per cent) (Table 6 ). More generally, there seems to be a distinction between material, routine-based activities with low value added, which are often decentralized, and intangible activities with higher value added, which instead are retained in house. These and other specific patterns of outsourcing, along with the distinguishing features we have highlighted above, relate to outsourcing drivers in RE; in other contexts the envisaged links may be somewhat different (see Section 2.2). In order to test this hypothesis, we can investigate it empirically by applying the outsourcing arguments in Section 2.1 to a large sample of RE firms. This is the core of our empirical analysis; its representativeness is described in Section 3.1, and the methodology and variables used are presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
The Data-set
The sample is composed of 166 firms drawn from a population of 257 companies located in the Italian province of Reggio Emilia-listed in both national (Intermediate Census 1996 of the National Institute of Statistics) and local (Camera di Commercio in Reggio Emilia 2001) databases-which were surveyed in 2002 (for a description of the survey see Pini, 2004) . These 257 firms operate in 19 manufacturing sectors as classified by the ISTAT-ATECO 91 codes and have at least 50 employees. This fact requires special consideration as SMEs, which make up the LPS in Emilia Romagna, present usually a very dense population in the territory, a fact which is not captured by our analysis. Nevertheless, the sample includes firms with both more and less than 100 employees, thus allowing some insights about the crucial role of firm size.
The number of respondent firms was 199 (the response rate was 77.4 per cent), economic performance indicators and variables relating to firm characteristics were available only for 166. Economic performance indicators cover the period 1998-2001 and are based on a data-set of firm balance sheets registered in the RE Chamber of Commerce and reclassified by the balance sheet unit of the RE Camera del Lavoro (trade union). Table A1 shows that the firms in the sample constitute 64.59 per cent of the entire firm population. Their distribution by sector and size is characterized by a limited bias when we compare these 166 firms with all the surveyed firms. Both textile sector and "small-sized" firms (50-99 employees) are slightly under-represented. However, no significant distortion emerges for the other sectors and employee size classes, with the number of interviewed firms approaching or reaching 100 per cent of the total in many cases (Table A2) . 
The Model
In general, the use of outsourcing as a dependent variable in any kind of empirical model with respect to other kinds of organizational innovations, poses some methodological problems. In particular, there is no reduced form equation that can be used as an "explanandum", such as in the case where outsourcing is used as an explanatory variable, for example, for different firm performance (e.g. Gorg and Hanley, 2004) . A robust and feasible way to proceed, however, is to adopt the idea of a "knowledge production function" (Griliches, 1979) , and define a reduced form that attempts to provide an explanation of outsourcing by exploiting a theoretically consistent set of covariates. Thus, we estimated the following reduced form:
where y OUT i;t represents the outsourcing "output" of firm i at time t. Here x k i;t is the set of outsourcing drivers of firm i which, in accordance with Section 2.1, we group into
x STRU i;t is the set of structural control variables, a 1 -5 is the corresponding set of coefficients, a 0 is the constant term and 1 i is the error term with the usual properties.
From an econometric point of view, the estimation of Equation 1 poses two main problems. First, heteroskedasticity, which frequently occurs with the use of cross-sectional data, may reduce the efficiency of the econometric estimates. Thus, all the succeeding estimates are carried out adopting a "robust" estimator which addresses this source of distortion. Second, there is a potential endogeneity problem, which arises in the investigation of the drivers of any innovation because they might conversely be thought of as innovation effects. Although endogeneity can be tested by a proper two-stage procedure, we should stress that the focus of the present application, like others based on purely crosssectional data, is primarily on extensive analysis of the correlations rather than the causal processes (Michie and Sheehan, 2005) .
From a methodological point of view it should be noted that, although a diachronic version of Equation 1 might possibly be more instructive for identifying which of the investigated drivers are the actual determinants of outsourcing, working with cross-sectional correlations, after controlling for the econometric problems they may pose, can be helpful for identifying the profile of the outsourcing firm. This exercise should be seen as different from, rather than purely preliminary to the other, as it more clearly highlights the structural features of the firm which are associated more closely to its outsourcing decision.
Given that the outsourcing arguments presented in Section 2.1 are quite complex, the search for proxies suitable to test them empirically through a model, such as that in Equation 1, is crucial. In this respect, this study incorporates some novelty related to the dependent and the independent variables. We will see that at least one proxy is identified for each and every one of the outsourcing drivers discussed in Section 2.1. Although in some cases data availability has forced us to resort to a rather indirect proxy, the theory in this paper is fully correspondent with its empirics.
The Variables
Dependent variable. The dependent variable of the model refers to the firm's decision to externalize, that is, to contract out some or all of its production activities and services (referred to in what follows, simply as activities). The outsourcing variable we use in the paper is more elaborated than a simple dummy, of the "yes we outsource" vs. "no we don't" kind found in the standard empirical literature. First, three outsourcing indicators are built in order to capture the firm's outsourcing propensity for each group, k, of the activities in Table 6 : ancillary activities, production supporting activities and production activities. More precisely, OUT k i is defined as the number of activities of a certain kind k outsourced by firm i (N k i )-irrespective of how many times the same kind of activity has been externalized-from a total number of activities N k :
Then, a synthetic indicator is obtained by working out, for each firm, an appropriate average of the three OUT k i indicators:
where s k is a "weight" which accounts for the difficulties firm i faces in outsourcing an activity of kind k. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the specific context to which our application refers gives a higher weight to the externalization of production activities than of production supporting activities and, in turn, of ancillary activities. Indeed, in a LPS, production activities are the core (i.e. the "primary" activities) of the firm's "value chain" (Porter, 1980) , while ancillary and production supporting activities function to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the former, though to different extents. Production activities, which are intensive of material assets, embody the core competences of the firm (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990) , and their outsourcing thus entails a higher risk of impoverishment. These arguments are confirmed from an empirical point of view: RE firms (on average, between 1998 and 2001) outsource ancillary activities to a greater extent than production supporting ones and, in turn, production activities (Table 6 ). This is further confirmed by more qualitative analysis of the outsourcing decisions among the firms in the sample, with the exception only of the textile sector.
We nevertheless apply two additional alternative weighting schemes in order to carry out a type of sensitivity analysis whose rationale is both theoretical and applied. Theoretically speaking, taking as given the arguments above in support of the first described (not arbitrary) weighting scheme, we might want to analyse whether a higher weight assigned to the also important "support production" activities will influence the results. This is our second option, which is more aligned to the big company model of outsourcing, in which such activities as R&D, human resource management, etc., are considered to be more core in terms of innovation and dynamic capabilities. Finally, as a third option, we also consider the "benchmark" case of equal weights for the three groups of drivers. From an empirical point of view, it is worth assessing whether the estimates and model fit change across specifications. We focus on the most robust of the three depicted (with robustness understood in the general economic-statistical meaning) and only comment on the other results for reasons of space. However, we would not expect there to be wide variations in the results, given that a very rich array of outsourcing typologies reduces the sensitivity of the overall outsourcing index to different weighting schemes. This is an empirical issue. The aim is to find the relatively better specification in terms of statistical and economic significance of the estimates. We believe that given the above considerations and in the spirit of the paper, a full sensitivity analysis using several (more than three) and not conceptually supported weighting schemes (common in experimental studies), is not relevant. We show that the results change only slightly and a single alternative presents higher economic and statistical significance.
From a methodological point of view, however, reference to a synthetic kind of dependent variable, such as OUT i , rather than a standard discrete dependent variable, such as outsourcing presence/absence, is urged by the nature of our sample firms, which, as already mentioned, have nearly all been involved in some kind of outsourcing.
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Independent variables. Some of the indicators used as independent variables deserve special mention as they were devised specifically to capture the complexity of the outsourcing arguments in this paper.
In terms of organizational drivers (Table 1) , ASPEC i proxies for (product) asset specificity at firm level in an objective way, by capturing each firm i's involvement in products whose local market (here meant as regional) is made up of a few rather than many competitors. Following Gonzalez-Diaz et al. (2000), the assets concerned possibly have few users and thus generate high expropriable quasi-rents, which determines the hold-up problems typically induced by their specificity.
13
ORGPLA i tries to capture the outsourcing implications of what we call "interface knowledge" by estimating the degree of matching between outsourced activities and the firm's formal organizational divisions. The higher this index, presumably the more explicit will be the interface knowledge linking the outsourced activities with those retained within the firm, since it is mediated by an explicit organizational relationship. Finally, we note that, due to data constraints, PRODDIF i is only a rough proxy for the heterogeneity of firm products/activities, as it accounts for the firm being involved in either large volume or small series production, rather than both kinds of production simultaneously. The production process is less complex in the first case than in the second, due in part to the relative product differentiation being inherently lower.
As far as the production drivers are concerned (Table 2) , firm relative wage (RELWAGE ij ) is proxied by working out the percentage deviation from the mean of sector j revealed by the unit labour cost for each of its firms i.
14 The indicators used to proxy the industrial drivers (Table 3) are generally fairly standard. Firm size, for example, is captured 12 On the other hand, although continuous, OUT i ranges from 0 to 1, and this makes our dependent variable fractional.
It is well known that this poses some econometric problems (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991) . However, since the aim of our study is to detect significant correlations rather than to estimate any kind of elasticity, these problems are not very severe and we can use ordinary least squares (OLS) corrected for heteroskedasticity. Also observe that, in the sample, the 0s are 14 out of 166, while the other limit value, that is, 1, is not recorded for any firm. The maximum observed value is 0.88, and mean and median, respectively, are 0.28 and 0.29. We are prevented from transforming OUT ji in a fully continuous logarithmic form (e.g. by applying the formula log[y/(1 (y)], given the presence of values equal to 0. Although such firms represent no more than 10 per cent of cases and we decided not to restrict the analysis only to firms adopting at least one of the analysed outsourcing typologies. 13 In order to see how asset specificity interacts with governance inseparability, the former was combined first, with the firm's union density (ASPEGOV1 i ) to check for outsourcing binding effects, second, with the union role in the externalization process (ASPEGOV2 i ), to check for governance enhancing effects. 14 As in other cases (e.g. INTASS i ), contingent fluctuations were smoothed by referring to average values over time for the available years (1998 -2001) . Note that FIRMUNC i tries to capture the firm-specific effects of sectoral uncertainty by relating the standard deviation of firm i's revenues (on average in the 1998 -2001 period) to the standard deviation of the branch j to which it can be related.
by using the log of the total number of employees of firm i (FIRMSIZE2 i ) in addition to the standard dummy variables in terms of firm employee classes (FIRMSIZE1 i ). INDREL i is an original synthetic indicator of the intensity and quality of the relationships within the firm among managers, employees and trade unions, and especially over innovation strategies (see , for its construction). Some more detail is required on innovation outsourcing drivers (Table 4) . Following Malerba and Orsenigo (1993) , we try to identify the firm's TR through two variables (to which the expected signs in Table 4 refer). HERFINNO j works out the concentration degree of a certain sector j through a standard Herfindahl index, but in terms of innovation rather than production. The higher (lower) it is, the more (less) concentrated are the firm's innovative activities, and the more it resembles a Schumpeter Mark II (Mark I) regime. SPEARINNO j proxies for the innovative turmoil of sector j over time by checking for the average degree of reshuffling in the ranking of its firms in terms of innovative activities, for different time periods. As usual, the closer the Spearman correlation index is to 1 ( 2 1), the more similar (dissimilar) are the two correspondent temporal firm rankings in terms of asset intangibility, and the more sector j resembles a Schumpeter Mark II (Mark I) regime.
In terms of the radicalness of firms' innovations, although with a certain approximation, RADINNO i classifies product and process innovations as radical, and quality innovations as incremental. The rationale for this proxy is empirical rather than theoretical. In interviews, innovations were distinguished into three categories by the managers' interviewees. While product and process innovations were indicated by them as the introduction of relatively new products and production processes, quality innovations are defined as improvements to the quality of an existing product and/or process. Based on this distinction, we built consistent dummies for each category, that is, INNOPROD, INNOPROC and INNOQUAL.
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Next we discuss the main results of our application. As a reference to help in their interpretation, Table A3 provides a correlation matrix. 
Main Results
First, we present the results of the econometric estimates of Equation 1 using the first weighting scheme discussed in Section 3.3, which assigns a higher weight to production activities (Table 7) . Empirically, we analyse the evidence associated with a general regression, drawing on the organizational, production, industrial and innovation drivers described in Section 2.1. This is the final step in a general to particular estimation procedure that eliminates insignificant covariates. We expect, and need to confirm, that the highest statistical significance is associated with this more exhaustive regression, which is richer in explanatory INNORE WARD i ), like INDREL, are synthetic indicators built in another study based on the same RE survey, but aimed at capturing organizational innovations and flexibility in the sampled firms . 16 The set of explanatory variables presented here and used as covariates in the analysis, results from preliminary selection of an extended full set of proxies deriving from the information sources related to the survey questionnaire Pini, 2004) . This preliminary selection was made to reduce collinearity problems and assures the exogeneity of independent factors, to mitigate biases. By dropping highly correlated potential regressors, the selection results in a limited set of covariates to test each hypothesis. The final correlation matrix (not shown) highlights the low figures for the main independent variables, which never exceed a threshold fixed at around 0.20.
factors. We deal with the risk of high correlations between factors by careful examination of the bivariate correlations between covariates.
17 Table 8 presents the main results from four separate specifications focusing on organizational, production, industrial and innovation drivers, respectively. Though the statistical significance is lower on average than in the general regression, due to a small number of explanatory factors, the analysis is interesting because it highlights the ranking among factors in terms of their individual explanatory power. We anticipate that organizational, innovation and, to a lesser extent, production factors are behind most of the economic and statistical explanations of outsourcing decisions. Starting with organizational drivers we note that, in the context of the general regression in Table 7, 18 the drivers that are most significant are those that are affected more by context-specific than pure TCE arguments. Indeed, the only confirmation of a TCE-type 17 Overall, the data-set is positive in this respect, since the correlation matrix (Table A3 ) presents few cases of highly correlated independent variables. 18 Table 7 shows only t ratios, since we do not emphasize elasticities, with the usual meaning that is *: significant at 10 per cent significance level; **: at 5 per cent significance level; ***: at 1 per cent significance level. Non-relevant covariates (with t ratios lower than 1.645) are generally omitted. All regressions by default adopt a White corrected robust estimator for the variance -covariance matrix to address heteroskedasticity. Only the size-related dummies and firm age controls are shown. Other controls include macro manufacturing sub-sectors (chemical, machinery, ceramic) or, alternatively, Pavitt (1984) production sectors-(Labour Intensive (LI), Resource Intensive (RI), Specialized Suppliers (SS), Scale Intensive (SI)), firm training coverage, international turnover market share, number of establishments per firm, firm performance and group membership. Control variables are not significant except for group membership (GROUP), which in some regressions has a negative sign and on average has a 5 per cent significance coefficient. However, they are included to control for cross-section heterogeneity. When highly insignificant they are omitted from the final specifications and not shown. Table 7 approach comes from firm product differentiation (PRODDIF)-which actually seems to increase the costs of vertical integration and favours outsourcing-and from its hierarchical degree-which actually might make outsourcing more contentious and therefore act to discourage it. In contrast, it seems that a firm's involvement in activities that do not encourage rent-seeking behaviours does not play a significant role in outsourcing: asset specificity (ASPEC) is not initially significant, and the same is true for its interaction with market uncertainty, the most typical of the TCE arguments. This is an important result, which supports the idea developed in Section 2.2 that the institutional setting of RE might render TCE arguments fairly irrelevant. In particular, the industrial relations typical of the area, and the "social capital" usually associated with a district kind of LPS might make the opportunism of agents, embodied in TCE, less explicative. This conflicts with the findings from studies of less context-specific environments, in which firms' transactions are more impersonal and less sensitive to geographic distance (e.g. Gonzalez-Diaz et al., 2000) .
Our expectations about the specification of the organizational outsourcing drivers in a LPS are further confirmed by the fact that, while ASPEGOV1 is shown not to be significant, ASPEGOV2 is significant and with a positive sign. In other words, if unions are actively involved in the outsourcing decisional process (by being informed or consulted), the firm seems to be more willing to externalize even activities that are intensive of specific assets. Although apparently counter-intuitive, this result is interesting. While it might be believed that a high level of unionization would increase governance inseparability in the firm, union participation in the outsourcing decision process actually transforms governance inseparability into governance separability conditioned on union involvement. This would seem to act as an organizational deterrent to hold-up behaviours, which are naturally associated with asset specificity. In this last respect, it is interesting that when controlling for the implications of outsourcing for firms that merely inform workers' unions, compared to those that consult workers' unions about their outsourcing decisions, none of the dummy variables used are very significant. On the other hand, interacting outsourcing consultation with asset specificity makes the relative variable significant, thus supporting our interpretation. This result is an important added value of our paper and represents a peculiar feature of the LPS model of outsourcing which is not usually found in the big company model.
Continuing with organizational drivers, we see that firm age (FIRMAGE) does not seem to increase the governance inseparability of the firm as much as does its possible experience in outsourcing. Also the variable interface knowledge (ORGPLA) confirms its role in codifying value chain activities into organizational relationship and thus favouring their externalization.
Among the production outsourcing drivers, the only one that has an explanatory role (see Table 7 ) is the role of unions (UNION). However, out of the two possible effects that the level of unionization might have on the decision to outsource, the negative one, which encompasses a possible increase in firm governance inseparability, seems to overcome the positive one, which instead passes through a possible increase in the firm's labour cost. This is a context-specific result comparable with the fact that, in the specific regression RELWAGE does not turn out to be significant in any of the versions of the index.
19 This is also as expected (Section 2.2), on the basis that, in a LPS context, the dualistic kind of relationship between suppliers and providers, which occurs in the big company model, becomes a developmental one (Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005) , in which outsourcing is neither a mere labour cost reducing strategy, nor a way of smoothing the costs of adapting to firm-specific demand changes: FIRMUNC is in fact also not significant. Finally, although RWSKILL is not as significant as SKILL, its negative sign seems to corroborate a strategic interpretation of outsourcing, where high in-house skills possibly make firms more selective in their outsourcing. While the role of the industrial drivers in Table 7 is limited to degree of concentration of the sector (HERFREV)-suggesting that outsourcing would be a better tool for competition than a rent appropriating instrument-the role of innovation-related ones is quite important. First, our theoretical expectation (Section 2.2) that in a LPS context vertically integrated firms might actually lose innovative advantage to disintegrated firms is confirmed: INNOPROD is significant and positive, suggesting that these LPS firms deal with outsourcing strategically, in particular to tap into the resources and competences of their suppliers, which they can then implement into technological, product innovations without a crucial knowledge leakage. This is supported by SPEARINNO, in this general regression being significant with a negative sign. Although the non-significance of HERFINNO, as in the specific regression, to an extent weakens this result, outsourcing would seem a safer strategy in sectors characterized by the turmoil (here reshuffling) typical of Schumpeter Mark I TRs. Finally, ORGINNO shows significant correlation with OUTCOM, but with a negative sign, suggesting that outsourcing represents an organizational innovation that substitutes for others the firm might adopt in an attempt to increase flexibility and, thereby, its dynamic capabilities and competitiveness. This suggests that the rationales might be quite different and amount to changes, respectively, in the "external" (outsourcing) and "internal" governance of the firm (the other organizational innovations).
It should be remembered that the above results were obtained by assigning greater importance to the externalization of production activities. Before testing the robustness of these results with respect to different weightings of the dependent variable, we examine the diagnostics of the regressions for the four individual groups of drivers (Table 8) .
In terms of organization outsourcing drivers (Table 8) , in the single regression, UNION is significant with a negative sign, 20 supporting the idea that the pervasiveness of unions might counteract decisions to outsource by increasing the firm's governance inseparability, although, as already mentioned, the translation of this inseparability in the costs of labour then prevails and becomes a driver of outsourcing.
The analysis of industrial outsourcing drivers provides an important insight which unfortunately disappears in the general regression. When we look at the size effects, the only significant and negative sign (with statistical levels ranging between 1 and 5 per cent) is SIZE1, which refers to firms with between 100 and 249 employees. When we use the alternative of the continuous size variable, this is also associated with a similar, from a significance perspective, negative coefficient, driven by the small -medium firm effect. In other words, it could be concluded that, compared to our "small" firms (50-99 employees), larger ones are possibly less involved in outsourcing activities.
22 This is in line with our expectations (Section 2.2) that in a LPS context, such as RE, outsourcing does not occur within a "dual" relationship, in which the largest firms simply exploit and subordinate the smaller firms to them, but is rather situated in a "developmental" or equivalent kind of relationship, in which the latter benefits from the former in terms of flexibility and specialization. It is interesting that the quality of industrial relations, INDREL, is negatively related to outsourcing, and its significance depends on the variable capturing the firm's skill intensity (SKILL). Accordingly, we can conclude that the more intense the industrial relations and involvement of qualified workers is, the less that outsourcing is a characteristic of the firm's strategy, with a moderate correlation. This is another interesting result, especially set against those obtained for the organizational level. Indeed, on this basis it is possible to interpret the processes of outsourcing in RE firms in two ways. On one level, the pervasiveness (captured by UNION) and the quality of the relationships with unions (proxied by INDREL) tend to determine a "bargaining equilibrium" in which outsourcing is less likely to emerge. On another level, if union representatives are more directly involved in the decision to outsource, which means that outsourcing occurs with their approval, then it is more likely to occur even in the face of organizational risks, such as those arising from opportunistic behaviour based on specific assets, as captured by ASPEGOV2. Finally, in comparing the analyses of innovation drivers and the general analysis, we can provide numerous insights (Table 8) . TECINNO is significant and positively correlated to OUTCOM and RADINNO, thus supporting the interpretation proposed by Mol (2005) , that vertical disintegration is not necessarily inconsistent with technological change, as standard organizational theories would argue (typically TCE based). Among the variables that capture flexibility, only the coefficient of FLEXWAGE has a negative sign, but this never exceeds a significance threshold in statistical terms.
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In terms of the robustness of results, if we use the weighting scheme that assigns greater importance to the outsourcing of production supporting activities, such as in the big company outsourcing model, the results change only slightly or not at all. Regarding the general regression (Table 7) , if we use the new weights, overall the evidence is confirmed 22 This result, to a certain extent, could be also due to the greater share of SMEs in the LPS with respect to the larger ones. In general, the size dummy FIRMSIZE1 is preferred to the continuous variable FIRMSIZE2 as being more significant, but the signs are consistent. Note, though, that somewhat unexpectedly, the size effect detected was also found by Abraham and Taylor (1996) for most outsourced activities, while Mol (2005) finds no significant size effects in a study on the relationship between outsourcing and innovation. 23 In relation to the controls, SKILL and FIRMAGE are both highly significant for this fourth and last conceptual level.
The interaction between incremental technological innovations (i.e. INNOQUAL) and ORGINNO is non-significant, which contrasts with Pini and Santangelo's (2005) significant and positive findings in a study using the same data-set.
with only some covariates showing a reduction (but not a loss) of significance:
24 UNION and GROUP decrease to 10 per cent, while only ORGINNO and FIRMAGE are not significant. The remaining covariates are at the same level of significance as in Table 7 . The F-test and R 2 results are marginally lower (0.0002 and 0.171, respectively).
Below we comment on the "new" results for specific realms as a means of comparison (Table 8) . Among the organizational drivers, some increase the associated t ratio, while others show a reduction: as a consequence, GROUP and ORGPLA are now below the 10 per cent threshold of statistical significance, and MKTUNC is at 5 per cent. All the other main covariates confirm the level of significance, and the fit measures are unaffected. Among the production drivers, only UNION has a decreased significance below 10 per cent, while RWSKILL and SIZE are confirmed as the main factors here. The firm's share of subcontracting is significant at 10 per cent, with a negative sign. Here the already weaker fit records a decrease, although F-test probability is well above 5 per cent, and R 2 is unchanged.
The analysis of industrial drivers shows that, with the new weights, GROUP decreases to below the 10 per cent threshold; RI is significant at 10 per cent; and the share of firm subcontracting is significant at 10 per cent with a negative sign. F-test probability is well above 5 per cent and R 2 is unchanged. Finally, in the case of innovation factors, the significance of SPEARINNO, INNOPROD and TECINNO is confirmed, while FIRMAGE loses explanatory power, and ORGINNO is around 10 per cent. The R 2 is unchanged (0.09).
To sum up, the overall evaluation when using the new weights confirms the evidence in the case of the most robust factors based on the "old" weights. Thus, those covariates that were not very significant (e.g. 5 per cent) lose their explanatory power or decrease to 10 per cent. All the factors that showed a 1 per cent significance are unaffected. F-tests and R 2 are generally marginally lower with respect to the other set of weights.
The results are similar if the three outsourcing indicators built for the three groups of drivers are added together, without attaching any weight. Thus, the three weighting options are: (1) assigning a higher weight to production activities and comparing to others (results not shown for reasons of space); (2) assigning a higher weight to production supporting activities; (3) applying equal weights, from which we can conclude that the main explanatory factors emerge in all of the specifications.
On the other hand, it is also interesting that relatively less robust factors lose significance in the weighting options (2) and (3), which, as a consequence, demonstrate marginally lower fit measures. Weighting (1) performs better from a statistical viewpoint. This is very important, given that (1) is not an arbitrary weighting scheme, but is supported in the paper on conceptual grounds, and on the basis of the contingent industrial scenario. Also, although there is some variability in significance across specifications, the main message of the paper, based on the factors that emerge as being primarily correlated to outsourcing, does not change.
Conclusions
This paper provides an exhaustive investigation of the factors that may drive or hamper the decisions of firms located in a LPS-Reggio Emilia, in the Italian region of Emilia Romagna-to outsource. These firms are characterized by a diffuse presence of SMEs and territorial networking. 25 The analysis of a representative sample of the firm population highlights spots of empirical evidence that, on the one hand, confirm some of the main results in the "outsourcing" literature, and on the other hand, signal the extent to which contingent features of the industrial system provide a picture containing many interesting, sometimes counter-intuitive, results. In order to retain the industrial nature of the LPS, we modelled the outsourcing dependent variable by giving a higher weighting to more production-type outsourcing, although we show that different weights do not affect the main evidence, which nevertheless is more robust using the higher weight linked to production activities. In extreme synthesis, in looking for the outsourcing drivers of the RE firms, we did not find transaction costs and transaction-cost-based factors among them. On the contrary, we did find other drivers, which are retained important by different strands of literature, such as the superior, specialized competence of the outsourcing providers, on which the resourcebased view of the issue instead focuses. To be sure, we did also find factors which hamper, rather than drive, the decision to outsource: in particular, the way in which the decision gets encapsulated in the industrial relations of the firm, an aspect on which a limited part of the literature on LPS has concentrated up to now. These results have important implications at different levels of analysis. Accordingly, it is worthwhile detailing them a bit more.
First, it appears that the outsourcing strategy in the investigated LPS differs somewhat from the big company model. For example, transaction-cost-related factors play a minor if any role in explaining outsourcing. On the other hand, the institutional setting (high number of SMEs, strong and "good" industrial relations, social capital contents) increases the importance for outsourcing decisions, of the features of governance inseparability. Assessment of the union's role and, more importantly, of industrial relations, in interaction with asset specificity, highlights how, in such a context, the peculiar features of and strategies related to outsourcing may be removed from the "dualistic" relationship in the big company model. In particular, it emerges that unions, on the one hand and as expected, initially act to slow negotiations but when the outsourcing becomes a reality they are kept informed or are involved. Therefore, the comprehensive empirical approach in this paper, based on a rich survey data-set, helps to identify the rationale for outsourcing in different economic contexts marked by a number of intangible and sector/size idiosyncratic factors not generally captured by official statistics.
Second, if we integrate the standard organizational analysis of outsourcing with insights from production and labour economics, industrial organization and innovation theory, the results are interesting and a strategic approach to outsourcing is revealed by our core empirical evidence. The positive correlation with technological innovation factors and negative correlation with the "human capital" content of firm employment are significant. The former suggests that within RE, firms are using outsourcing to tap into the technological knowledge and capabilities of providers to use them in their innovation activities. The latter suggests that a high-skilled (and well-paid) workforce, which enables high in-house competences, is making firms more selective about outsourcing. A final corroboration of strategic use of outsourcing is that although it is a joint factor in technological innovation, outsourcing emerges as significantly negatively correlated to organizational innovations. Thus, outsourcing seems to be one of the alternative means by which firms try to restructure their internal organization.
Our comprehensive analysis suggests that the profile of a RE outsourcing firm is more consistent with a "network/cluster" than with a "dualistic" approach, strategic rather than operative. Outsourcing, along with other dynamics, is being spurred by competition based on labour-related flexibility, wages, innovation dynamics and employment levels, which typically are historically and institutionally determined features of this LPS. Outsourcing, therefore, is a strategic phenomenon explained mostly by organizational and innovationrelated factors with some contribution from production and industrial issues.
The picture is coherent insofar as RE outsourcing firms are relatively small and do not just "exploit" smaller subcontractors; it conceives of a hierarchical organizational structure and the organizational matching of outsourcing, respectively, as being an obstacle and an enabler; it does seem to use subcontracting to save on labour costs or to smooth unexpected demand peaks; it uses outsourcing strategically, particularly to access the resources and competences of suppliers, which it can then implement into technological, product innovations without a crucial knowledge leakage; and it uses outsourcing to substitute, rather than as a complement to other organizational innovations, based on different paths of governance change (respectively, external and internal) toward flexibility.
The picture of the results we have provided has a number of implications at different levels of analysis. First of all, at the research level, it encourages new areas of investigation of outsourcing and, in general, of the firm's vertical scope, in which the "institutional structure of production", not only is a matter of transaction costs and capabilities (Jacobides and Winter, 2005) , but also of "embeddedness" in specific, and often, local production systems. Second, from a management point of view, the paper suggests that outsourcing, usually retained as a sort of "external" organizational innovation, should be dealt with by the managers along with other "internal" aspects of the organization: in particular, with those which go under the headings of human resource management and industrial relations. Indeed, depending on their interdependent use, outsourcing could even become complementary to standard, technological innovations. The argument according to which the separation of activities outsourcing involves would diminish the feedback from "internal" to "external" operations (e.g. Naghavi and Ottaviano, 2006) actually seems less relevant in a local context such as the one we have investigated. Although further investigation would be necessary to confirm it, the production specialization of the system, along with the social capital which makes the firms' relationships both competitive and cooperative to a certain extent, apparently make it easier for the managers to integrate new innovative solutions in production processes even when a separation of activities has happened.
We conclude by suggesting some directions for future research. First, drawing from surveys we could construct a panel data-set consisting of two waves of observed firms or/and a cross-section data-set with lagged terms for the set of explanatory variables, at the cost, though, of reducing the sample of firms. This would allow us to check for the effects of outsourcing activities on firm performance (i.e. profitability, productivity). It would also be possible to extend this work to other local economic systems in the region or the nation, in order to assess how much the present results are affected by the idiosyncratic features of the industrial area of Reggio Emilia, which, however, is largely representative of European industrial production systems. Note: Critical margin of error for small sample u ¼ 0.10 Table A3 . 
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